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Beyond a Border Conflict: Indigenous Involvement in the
Mexican-American War
R I L E Y BOW E R S ∗
Settled squarely in the heartlands of many Indigenous Americans’ ancestral territories, the disputed area between the
United States and Mexico fought over during the Mexican-American War is often solely conceptualized as the latter
definition. The Indigenous peoples of these lands themselves are often just as ignored in the historical narrative of this
period as are their ties to the lands. The research presented in this article aims to bring to light this often understudied
part of the Mexican-American War, being Indigenous involvement in the war itself and the lasting effects that it had
upon Indigenous groups. This article focuses on Apache, Comanche, and Navajo perspectives leading up to, during, and
following the war. By centering these groups in the narrative, it is clear they were not sidelined or forgotten during
the conflict, but rather were active players in the overall struggle for power in the region, engaging in both warfare and
diplomacy. As such, equal attention should be given to these Indigenous participants in the war in further studies of the
conflict.

The Mexican-American War is often studied as a border conflict between Mexico and the United
States of America. Following the United States’ annexation of Texas, the dispute over the border
of Mexico and the United States’ newly acquired territory resulted in the declaration of war
between the two nations. What is often understudied, or completely overlooked, however, are the
Indigenous peoples of what became this disputed border region and the roles that they played in
this conflict. Indigenous peoples had been living in this region since time immemorial, and the
incursion of colonial powers meant that this war was not only a border dispute for the Apache, the
Comanche, the Navajo, and many other Indigenous groups, as it was for the United States and
Mexico, but also a war to preserve their way of life against American and Mexican governmental
persecution.
In this paper, I will analyze the roles that Indigenous groups played in the Mexican-American
War as well as their political, personal, and material motivations for participating. By placing
their experiences at the center of the conflict, as opposed to the sidelines, I argue that Indigenous
groups that participated in the war should not be considered inconsequential agitators, but rather
active combatants and political players. The motivations, engagements, and diplomatic pursuits
of these Indigenous groups, as well as the lasting effects that the war had upon them, should be
given equal attention in studies as is given to the United States and Mexico, respectively.
Whereas the United States and Mexico were concerned with disputed territory, the Indigenous
populations had much more at stake. With the incursion of settlers and soldiers from both the
United States and Mexico, Indigenous groups faced loss of land, detrimental threats to their
population through warfare, potential destabilization of their way of life, and the loss of culture.
The outcome of the war between the United States and Mexico would determine the future of
∗ Riley Bowers is an alumnus of West Virginia University with a BA in history from Morgantown, West Virginia.
Pursuing a career in academics, Riley’s research interests often connect on a personal level to his family history, focusing
on Indigenous American and German history. Prior to this article’s publishing, he participated in the WVU Research
Apprenticeship Program, where he conducted a multifaceted research project including the exploration of Buffalo Bill’s
Wild West Show’s travels in German-speaking Central Europe and the search for the lost regalia of a Blackfoot veteran of
WWI.
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the border region, and Indigenous peoples planned accordingly. Some took advantage of the
opportunity of war by engaging in raids to increase wealth or even to bolster dwindling numbers.
Others, such as Mangas Coloradas of the Apache, sought to secure peace and the survival of his
people’s way of life through diplomacy with the United States.1 Regardless of how individuals or
groups felt the future was going to pan out, what was certain was that this was a time of action
and that it was upon these actions that the future depended.
During the period leading up to and throughout the Mexican-American War, both American
and Mexican politicians held negative attitudes toward the Indigenous populations. The United
States was well into the Indian Removal Era by the start of the war, and the rhetoric among
American politicians toward Indigenous peoples had long been that they were “uncivilized.” Many
American politicians of this era forced treaties through various means on Indigenous groups of
what became the American Southeast under the notion that their peoples and the white American
population could never coexist so close to one another. “These untutored sons of the forest,
cannot exist in a state of Independence, in the vicinity of the white man. If they will persist in
remaining where they are, they may begin to dig their graves and prepare to die.”2 This letter,
written to President Andrew Jackson by a friend of his at the beginning of the Indian Removal Era,
exemplifies the European-American attitude of superiority and willingness to resort to violence
to achieve political goals present throughout this era, including the Mexican-American War.
This American rhetoric, which painted all Indigenous groups as primitive and lesser peoples,
had further implications beyond the already damaging dehumanization. It provided justification
for American expansionism into Indigenous lands. President Andrew Jackson argued this position
in his message to Congress on Indian Removal: “And is it supposed that the wandering savage
has a stronger attachment to his home than the settled, civilized Christian? Is it more afflicting
to him to leave the graves of his fathers than it is to our brothers and children?”3 Jackson’s
point was simple: Indigenous peoples could hold no legitimate claim to land, and therefore
Christians (Americans) could freely annex lands occupied by the “wandering savages.” This
outlook remained prominent through the Mexican-American War, as American forces laid claim
to lands within la Apachería or la Comanchería, disregarding Indigenous sovereignty.
Whereas American politicians had for some time viewed the Indigenous population as a
temporary concern whose resistance to American expansionism would eventually fizzle out,
Mexican politicians such as Mariano Otero viewed the Indigenous population as a serious
hinderance to the advancement of Mexico as a nation. Otero, a liberal politician of his era,
concerned himself with how the people of Mexico affected the prosperity of the nation. Indigenous
groups were no exception to this critique. Otero described the Indigenous way of life as “brutalized”
and “differ[ing] little or not at all from what it was when they were subjects of the great emperor
Montezuma.”4 Indigenous groups like the Apache also made it difficult for settlers to populate
the border region with their “devastating efficiency” in warfare, thus rendering a great deal of
northern Mexico out of the control of the Mexican government.5 These negative effects, from the

1John Upton Terrell, Apache Chronicle (New York: World Publishing Company, 1972), 177-180.
2Alfred Balch to Andrew Jackson, January 8, 1830, https://www.loc.gov/item/maj011860/.
3Andrew Jackson, “On Indian Removal,” December 6, 1830, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate,
1789-1990, National Archive, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=25.
4Mariano Otero, “Considerations Relating to the Political and Social Situation of the Mexican Republic in the Year
1847,” in The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gilbert M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2002), 227.
5Luis González y González, “Liberals and the Land,” in The Mexico Reader: History, Culture, Politics, ed. Gilbert
M. Joseph and Timothy J. Henderson (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 242.
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perspective of Mexican politicians like Otero, extended to Mexico’s struggles in the war with the
United States.
By the start of the Mexican-American War, the Indigenous groups of the Great Plains region
grew accustomed to raiding as a commonplace means of obtaining essential resources as well as
making a profit. Such was the case that raiding had come to produce more lucrative results than if
their attention was focused solely on hunting buffalo.6 This proved to be of significant concern to
the US government, especially regarding its control of the border region. “The mischievous habits
of these Indians. . . as well as a proper regard for the security of our own citizens, who have already
suffered so much from their predatory and marauding excursions, will commend this subject
to the attention and early consideration of Congress,” reads a report from the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, dated November 30, 1846.7
The incursion of settlers into Indigenous lands was not the sole motivation for an increase in
raiding on behalf of the Indigenous population. Indigenous soldiers who volunteered to serve
in the Mexican army were often treated poorly by commanding officers who would “abandon
[Indigenous volunteers] at the moment of danger.”8 Following their service, which had taken from
them a harvest season and livestock, many Indigenous volunteers for the American army were
improperly compensated. A spike in raiding resulted from this, as many Indigenous volunteer
soldiers sought payment through other means.9
Population loss among tribes such as the Comanche was also a factor in the increasing number
of raids. Following a severe decline in population beginning with an epidemic in 1780, the
Comanche diversified their tribe and bolstered their numbers by taking captives and assimilating
them into the tribe.10 Having faced this population decline for decades by the middle of the
19th century, the Comanche adopted a systematic form of captive indoctrination, allowing for
the supplementation of their population to the best of their ability. The Mexican-American War
provided further opportunity for captive-taking, and the captive experience of Macario Leal,
which will be analyzed later in this work, demonstrates the process of assimilation that the
Comanche employed and how captives participated within Comanche society, including during
warfare.11
Traditional rivalries and grudges also contributed to the bloodshed between Indigenous
groups and colonial forces, particularly Mexican soldiers. In the case of the Luiseño, who lived
predominantly near San Diego, tension had long existed between the group and Spaniards, and
this tension was inherited by Mexicans. Missionaries were known for committing acts of violence
like whipping in their conversion attempts, and Mexican soldiers regularly took supplies and
livestock from the Luiseño as they traveled through Luiseño territory. These tensions came to a
boiling point in December of 1846, after United States General Kearney routed Mexican forces
who were laying siege to San Diego. Mexican rangers dispersed the siege, and eleven of them
were attacked and killed by the Luiseño, who recognized them as Mexicans as they traveled
through Luiseño land. The Luiseño, who had long feuded with Mexican soldiers, felt encouraged
6Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2008), 356-357, Apple Books.
7W. L. Marcy and W. Medill, “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” Daily Union (Washington, DC), December 28, 1846, Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.
loc.gov/lccn/sn82003410/1846-12-28/ed-1/seq-1/.
8Otero, “Political and Social Situation,” 228.
9Albert L. Hurtado, “‘Conciliate the Inhabitants:’ Federal Indian Administration during the Mexican War,” in Indian
Survival on the California Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), 86.
10DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 146.
11Joaquín Rivaya-Martínez et al., “The Captivity of Macario Leal: A Tejano among the Comanches, 1847–1854,”
Southwestern Historical Quarterly 117 no. 4 (2014): 372-402, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24388624.
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by the advance of American soldiers against Mexico and were likely further motivated by this to
engage the group of eleven Mexican rangers.12 This incident, which became known as the Pauma
Massacre, named after the Pauma ranchería of the Luiseño, demonstrates Indigenous military
engagement against colonial powers despite not having the capacity to field large armies in battle.
Lastly, Indigenous groups of the borderlands stood to benefit from engagements and raids in
the Mexican-American War simply due to the fact that it promised the accumulation of wealth,
often through livestock. Indigenous groups of the Southern Plains, such as the Comanche, the
Kiowa, and the Kiowa Apache, highly valued horses, as the animals granted wider access to
buffalo, further range to trade and raid, and many other benefits. While horses could be acquired
through breeding or the capture of wild horses, the preferred method of many Southern Plains
Indigenous groups was to obtain horses through raiding.13 Comanche raids and the acquisition of
goods from them allowed the tribe to profit significantly off of trade with other groups, including
Indigenous groups from the East who had been moved to Indian Territory, such as the Choctaw
and the Cherokee. This trade could be facilitated between the tribes face-to-face or through
Comanche allies such as the Wichita or the Caddo.14 While one could argue in favor of the
positives achieved through the increased profitability of raiding and hunting that was granted by
the acquisition of horses and livestock, this ultimately created a cycle of violence that devolved
into further reliance on raiding to obtain resources. Increased numbers of livestock gained through
raiding competed with buffalo for grazing land, and the numbers of buffalo steadily decreased at
the hands of capable hunters with access to horses.15
Despite sharing some similar motivations and concerns, Indigenous groups of the border
region did not act homogeneously. Differing opinions regarding how to act in this tumultuous
period existed within and across these Southern Plains societies. Some groups were motivated to
raid by the potential for economic gain or perhaps even for the sake of revenge.16 Others sought
peace with one side or another, recognizing the strategic value of creating an alliance to face a
common enemy.
The invasion of American soldiers into New Mexico, and thus la Apachería, was of natural
concern to the Apache as much as it was to Mexico. The aim of the United States was to
acquire much of the border territory shared by the United States and Mexico, which included
la Apachería. General Stephen Kearney had promised New Mexicans on behalf of the United
States to “forthwith halt all Indian depredations,” referencing Indigenous raids.17 The Apache
recognized that this policy posed an imminent threat to their existence, as they often relied on
their ability to acquire resources and goods through raiding in this vast territory. In accordance
with their concerns about a future under American rule, some Apache sought to make peace with
the invading Americans.
An Apache group under the leadership of Mangas Coloradas exemplified an attempt at
diplomacy with the United States. In October of 1846, Mangas Coloradas led a delegation to
speak with General Kearney. During this conference of leaders, Mangas Coloradas made his
case to General Kearny that the Apache and the Americans should become allies and combine
their military efforts against a common enemy: Mexico. In this conference, the Apache leader’s
primary objective was to ensure that the United States would not interfere with the Apache’s
12Millard F. Hudson, “The Pauma Massacre,” Annual Publication of the Historical Society of Southern California 7,
no. 1 (1906): 13-21, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41168601.
13DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 148-149.
14DeLay, 338-340.
15DeLay, 647-648.
16DeLay, 386-387.
17Terrell, Apache Chronicle, 174-175.
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practice of raiding Mexican settlements, while establishing peaceful relations with Americans.
The American general would not budge on his position that any individual living within United
States’ territory must abide by the laws of the land. This included Mexicans who lived in the
newly acquired territory, who were then to be considered Americans, as well as Indigenous
peoples like the Apache. This meant the Apache must cease their raiding.18 Although the leaders
could not reach an agreement, this demonstrates the active role that Indigenous groups such as the
Apache played in the war, participating in negotiations as independent sovereignties with their
own political motivations.
Despite the breakdown of negotiations between Mangas Coloradas and General Kearney, the
Apache and the Americans remained on relatively peaceful terms throughout the course of the war.
Recognizing that American forces were focusing their primary attention toward their Mexican
adversaries, the Apache in large part avoided altercation with the Americans as they passed
through la Apachería. However, some Apache did take advantage of their position as Americans
passed through, avoiding large-scale engagements but raiding supplies and livestock when the
moment was right. That is not to say that Apache involvement and implications regarding the
Mexican-American War were insignificant by any means, however, as the disputed border region
to which both Mexico and the United States staked claim laid across la Apachería, the homeland
of the Apache, the outcome of the war would determine in large part the fate of the Apache.19
As the leader Mangas Coloradas had come to understand, American policy and relations with
the Indigenous population of the border region was to differ quite significantly from those of the
Mexican government.
This significant difference was highlighted as the United States began to adopt the role of
“savior” to the northern Mexicans. This meant that they intended to put a stop to raiding on behalf
of the Indigenous population and defend against it whenever possible, something the government
of Mexico had not been able to effectively accomplish. Some Apache, while largely avoiding
raids against Americans, continued their campaign against Mexican settlements. American forces,
then viewing the occupied border region as American soil and subsequently viewing the Mexican
inhabitants as American citizens (though excluding the Indigenous population from this rule),
sought to repel the Apache attacks. One such situation occurred in May of 1847 in Coahuila,
where Apaches inflicted a number of raids against the Mexican population within. United States’
forces under the leadership of Captain John Reid intercepted the group of supposedly Lipan
Apaches. A battle ensued, and in the aftermath thereof captives and livestock were recovered.20
Diplomatic negotiations between the Navajo and the Americans came about a bit differently
in comparison to the delegation led by Mangas Coloradas of the Apache. Whereas Mangas
Coloradas sought out the Americans to negotiate, it was the Americans who called upon the
Navajo to meet in response to the large number of Navajo raids in the region of New Mexico.
Zarcillos Largos, a young Navajo headman, expressed at this delegation the sentiments of the
Navajo:
Americans! you [sic] have a strange cause of war against the Navajos. We have waged
war against the New Mexicans for several years. . . . You have lately commenced a
war against the same people. . . . This is our war. We have more right to complain of
you for interfering in our war, than you have to quarrel with us for continuing a war
18Terrell, 178-180.
19Terrell, 180-181.
20DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 788-789.
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we had begun long before you got here. If you will act justly, you will allow us to
settle our own differences.21
This perspective of the Navajo gives a larger insight into the other perspectives of the Indigenous
participants in the war. Not only did the Navajo see themselves as active participants in the
war, but also that Americans interrupted the Navajo’s war with New Mexicans. The American
response to this was ever consistent, stating that the Americans had defeated the New Mexicans,
and in accordance with treating them kindly, these New Mexicans were now Americans and thus
were to be protected as Americans from raiding parties. This group of Navajo resolved to make
peace with the Americans and the New Mexicans following the discussion, thus exemplifying
successful peace talks during the Mexican-American War between an Indigenous nation and a
colonial power.22
A Comanche delegation under the leadership of Pia Kusa made a similar attempt to the
Apache at a cooperative peace with the United States in September of 1846. Pia Kusa encountered
US General John Wool in Texas and seized the opportunity to seek council with him. Pia Kusa,
seeing Mexico as a potential common enemy with the United States, aimed to negotiate a deal
with General Wool. Pia Kusa’s proposal was that, in exchange for weapons and ammunition, the
Comanche would kill many Mexicans. The Comanche leader, however, was not only met with a
denial from the general, but also the promise of corporal punishment to anyone caught attacking
Mexicans unprovoked.23 Although unsuccessful in their attempt at an agreement with the United
States, the Comanche clearly viewed themselves as active participants in the war and, despite
American forewarning, acted as such.
Captive-taking remained an integral aspect of the warfare that the Comanche waged against
the Mexican settlements. The account of Macario Leal, a young farmhand at the time of his
capture by the Comanche in 1847, details a story shared by many captives of his time. The
Comanche attacked his family’s settlement, killed some of his relatives, and took Macario back to a
ranchería. Not long after his capture, he and his captors encountered American smugglers, whom
the Comanche then killed. After a year of serving the Comanche by tending to a herd of horses,
he had learned the language. They subsequently brought him on a raid against American forces
in which the Comanche were successful in killing their enemy and seizing goods.24 This account
from the captive himself details the captive-taking process that the Comanche utilized, with
which they attempted to assimilate their captives and make them into functioning members within
Comanche society, including participating in war campaigns against Mexicans and Americans
alike.
Raiding continued in the border region, specifically targeting Mexican settlements. United
States’ forces made efforts to defend these Mexican populations, seemingly acting in accordance
with the statements from Generals Kearney and Wool, adopting the position of “savior” to the
northern Mexicans. As it was paramount to incorporate into the United States the northern
territories of Mexico, such as New Mexico, US forces felt obligated to ensure the safety of
soon-to-be citizens, as the Mexican government’s ineptitude in defending the citizens of its
northern territories was one of the justifications for war that the US listed. With the assumption
of the role of protector of this newly acquired territory came the further incrimination of the
21John Taylor Hughes et al., Doniphan’s Expedition and the Conquest of New Mexico and California (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1906), 306, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Doniphan_s_Expedition
_and_the_Conquest_o/4Ztz5znHbVAC?hl=en&gbpv=1.
22Hughes et al., Doniphan’s Expedition, 306-308.
23DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 769-770.
24Rivaya-Martínez et al., “Captivity of Macario Leal,” 394-397.
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Indigenous populations as enemies that needed to be subdued.25 The citizens of the newly
acquired territories came to be viewed as Americans, no longer as Mexicans, and thus the common
enemy referenced by Indigenous leaders and diplomats such as Pia Kusa, Zarcillos Largos, and
Mangas Coloradas ceased to exist. In other words, American forces in the region now had their
sights trained on Indigenous groups such as the Comanche, the Navajo, and the Apache.
Warfare and raiding, which affected all peoples of the border region regardless of allegiance
or origin, did much to shape the public opinion of Indigenous populations. Many citizens of
Mexico and the United States shared similar but distinct prejudices and dispositions toward the
Indigenous population, particularly regarding the peoples of the border region. The rhetoric
employed varied in its method of depicting these peoples, but what can be derived is that many
feared Indigenous groups as legitimate threats and forces to be reckoned with.
In Mexico, where a large portion of the population was of Indigenous or of mixed-Indigenous
descent, efforts were made to differentiate between sedentary and nomadic peoples, or, more
specifically, civilized indios and los bárbaros. Much of the general population of Mexico,
especially those in close contact with Indigenous groups considered los bárbaros, viewed these
peoples as mindless killers whose only purpose was to spill blood and to steal.26 Although the
raiding committed by these peoples was largely the result of generations of warfare between
them and colonial entities and the processes of colonialism, which depleted resources to the
Indigenous population, their motivations were veiled by the lack of formal declarations. Thus, to
their enemies, los bárbaros acted without purpose, and had therefore earned their epithet.27
In the case of the American public, race was often at the center of the discussion regarding
the differences between themselves, being European-Americans, and the Indigenous populations.
By viewing Indigenous groups of the border region unanimously as other than themselves yet
indistinct from each other, European-Americans successfully portrayed these Indigenous groups
as a dangerous and otherworldly enemy whose retaliation to their own acts of violence served as
further incrimination of their people.28 American frontiersmen were celebrated for their exploits
and heroism against Indigenous peoples. “An incarnate devil in Indian fight. . . had raised more
hair from heads of Redskins than any two men in the Western country,” reads the description
of Lieutenant Kit Carson that appeared in a Maryland newspaper in 1848.29 The American
public had made an enemy of the Indigenous population of the Americas and, in the course of the
Mexican-American War, needed no further justification to wage war against this enemy.
The Mexican-American War concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
on February 2, 1848. With the signing of this treaty, Mexico ceded over half of its territory to
the United States. In doing this, the United States received large parts of what would become
the American Southwest. The ramifications of this treaty regarding the Indigenous groups of
the border region were monumental. This is particularly true for Article XI of the treaty, which
outlines how the US government will proceed in relations concerning the “savage tribes.”30
Article XI outlines four principal provisions agreed upon by the governments of the United
States and Mexico, each of which significantly impacted the future of the region that became
25DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 779-782.
26DeLay, 639.
27DeLay, 639-640.
28DeLay, 616-617.
29“Kit Carson in Europe,” Cecil Whig (Elkins, MD), October 28, 1848, Chronicling America: Historic American
Newspapers, Library of Congress, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn83016348/1848-10-28/ed-1/seq-2/.
30“Article XI,” Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, February 2, 1848, Perfected Treaties, 1778-1945, Record Group 11,
General Records of the United States Government, 1778-1992, National Archives, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?flash=false&doc=26&page=transcript.
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the American Southwest and the lives of Indigenous peoples who lived there. The first and
second of these provisions committed the United States government to the prevention of and the
punishment for Indigenous incursions and raiding across the border into Mexico. In situations
when punishment for raiding across the border was required, the United States would do so “with
equal diligence and energy, as if the same incursions were meditated or committed within its own
territory, against its own citizens.”31 Whereas prior to the war and the signing of this treaty, the
government of Mexico was largely responsible for this duty and largely ineffective in enforcing it,
the end of the war meant that this responsibility transferred to the US.
The third and fourth provisions prohibited American citizens from purchasing captives or any
stolen goods from Mexico and ensured that the United States would work to “rescue and return”
any captives. This meant that Indigenous groups who profited from their ability to acquire goods,
captives, and livestock through raiding Mexican settlements and selling them elsewhere would
have greater difficulty in finding someone willing to purchase from them. This also guaranteed
that the United States would be the primary enforcement for the rescue of captives. Economically,
this was a significant obstacle that stood in the way of these groups, as it significantly decreased
resource pools.32 These developments led some Indigenous groups to search for new methods to
preserve their system of resource acquisition.
American settlers were encouraged to migrate westward with the expansion of territory
claimed by the United States and the discovery of gold in California in 1849. This resulted in
increased conflict in the American Southwest between Indigenous groups, such as the Apache,
and the Americans. Some of the Apache, who had long been accustomed to raiding Mexican
settlements and as a result of the treaty between the United States and Mexico had greater difficulty
doing so, turned their attention to the American settlers and prospectors who were passing through
la Apachería. Throughout the years immediately following the end of the war, Apache raids often
targeted American travelers who passed through the region. Mangas Coloradas explained the
situation accordingly, “You tell us we must not rob the Mexicans south of the border. If we cannot
do that, we must steal from the Americans.”33
Conflict with the Apache continued for many decades following the war, as multiple Apache
groups continued to sustain themselves off of raiding both Americans and Mexicans. Many
Apache groups came to resist the Peace Policy of President Ulysses S. Grant’s administration, of
which one of the objectives was to require “roving” Indigenous groups, such as the Apache, to
relocate to a reservation, where they must remain. This further exacerbated the period of violence
between Apache groups that resisted forced relocation and continued to live nomadically and
the United States and Mexico.34 Apache leaders, such as Geronimo, and their followers became
skilled at evading capture for many years, only surrendering for the final time in 1886.35 Though
these conflicts extended beyond the timeline of the Mexican-American War, they came about in
many ways as a direct result of the war, stemming from American incursion into la Apachería
and federal policy toward the Indigenous population.
The Comanche, too, faced a similar period of violence with the United States. Following
the end of the Mexican-American War, Comanche groups continued to raid in Texas and in
Indian Territory and hunt on the Great Plains during the warmer months, returning to reservation
grounds when the weather turned cold. The increase in commercial buffalo hunting further
31“Article XI,” Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
32“Article XI.”
33Terrell, Apache Chronicle, 180-185.
34Terrell, 289-292.
35Edward K. Faison, “Lieutenant Faison’s Account of the Geronimo Campaign,” Journal of the Southwest 54, no. 3
(Autumn 2012): 537-538, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24394880.
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thinned the buffalo population, as Comanche groups struggled to acquire resources necessary to
continue living as they had. This resulted in the outbreak of war between the United States and
the Comanche, who had attacked a group of buffalo hunters at an outpost known as Adobe Walls
in June of 1874. This open warfare came to an end in 1875, as many of the remaining groups
of Comanche resolved to stay on the reservation, thus forfeiting their ability to continue living
openly on the Great Plains.36
Navajos were no exception to the pattern. Warfare and raiding between Navajos and Americans
became commonplace after the Mexican-American War, referred to as the Navajo Wars. The
ultimate goal of the United States was to acquire much of the territory upon which the Navajo (and
other groups) dwelled and confine them to smaller reservations where they would refrain from
older traditions of raiding and focus primarily on agricultural means of sustenance.37 Beginning
in 1864, American forces under the command of Kit Carson attacked Navajos and their resources
with the intent of forcing them into compliance and to have them relocate to a reservation that
had been assigned to them. This forceful relocation became known as the Long Walk, when the
Navajo were taken to the Bosque Redondo Reservation, an undesirable piece of land that could
not properly support the growth of crops due to poor soil and insufficient water. Navajos and their
livestock suffered a great deal in this land, and it was not until 1868 that a treaty was agreed upon
in which the Navajo were assigned new reservation grounds that contained some of the lands that
the Navajo recognized as their ancestral homes.38
The implications of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo combined with the influx of American
traffic through the new American Southwest, and thus Indigenous lands, set into motion the
series of events that ended with numerous Indigenous groups surrendering on the Great Plains.
This surrender would be accompanied with one-sided agreements in which Indigenous groups
were often required to give up their practices of living mobile and open in the region. In the
case of the Apache, the Comanche, and the Navajo, periods of violence stemming from the
Mexican-American War that depleted the natural resources available to the Indigenous groups
ultimately resulted in lopsided treaties with the United States in which traditional homelands and
practices were often stripped away in favor of sedentary lifestyles limited to reservation grounds.
The lasting effects of the war and the conflicts that arose from it seeped into media portrayal
of Indigenous groups, as western films soared in popularity in the 20th century. The formula to
the creation of these films often situated Indigenous groups, like the Apache, as standing in the
way of American expansionism or as “obstacles to civilization.” Popular films, such as the movie
Stagecoach (1939), neglected to portray Apache culture or political motivations, instead using
the Indigenous group as a violent force that exists simply to oppose American newcomers to the
region. This perception of the Apache is rooted in the period following the Mexican-American
War, when Apache groups clashed with American settlers and soldiers who participated in the
incursion into la Apachería.39 This 20th-century American perception of the Apache is similar to
the northern Mexican perception of los bárbaros throughout the period leading up to and during
the Mexican-American War, in that they were viewed as bloodthirsty killers standing in the way
of progress. While an indirect consequence of the Mexican-American War, portrayals such as
36Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 337-341, https://www.
jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1njn13.
37John L. Kessell, “General Sherman and the Navajo Treaty of 1868: A Basic and Expedient Misunderstanding,”
Western Historical Quarterly 12, no. 3 (July 1981): 253-254, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3556587.
38Traci Brynn Voyles, Wastelanding: Legacies of Uranium Mining in Navajo Country (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2015), 33-37, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5749/j.ctt155jmrg.5.
39Janne Lahti, “Silver Screen Savages: Images of Apaches in Motion Pictures,” Journal of Arizona History 54, no. 1
(Spring 2013): 54, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24459198.
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these continue to contribute to negative stereotypes of savagery, ignoring the political motivations
of the complex societies Indigenous to what became the American Southwest.
In researching this subject, as is often the case when studying the history of Indigenous
American populations, many of the accessible primary sources came from non-Native sources.
There are numerous reasons as to why this is the case. Lack of written language is one of the
most prominent factors in this drawback. Nomadic groups, like the Comanche, did not make
formal declarations of war in the same style that Mexican and American citizens alike were most
accustomed to.40 Because of this lack of penned intentions, much of what can be understood and
studied about these groups during this period comes from the observations of outsiders who had
often not grown up within the culture or society that they observed.
Biases must be considered when reading primary sources, especially if they fall under the
aforementioned category, in which they are written by outside observers. In the case of the
Mexican-American War, many of the primary sources are written by Mexican or American
soldiers and politicians who had many reasons to consider Indigenous groups as enemies or
inherently other from the observers. American reports from the BIA praise Indigenous groups
and peoples that are taking steps toward “civilization” in the same document that denounces
“roving and unstable” Indigenous groups within Texas as “the most barbarous and least civilized
portions of the Indian race.”41 This separation of Indigenous groups into categories of “civilized”
and “barbarous” was commonplace in both the United States and Mexico. In the United States,
this rhetoric was an integral aspect of the Indian Removal Era, during which Indigenous groups
were not only encouraged through various means, e.g., through violence or coercion, to live on
reservations, but also to conform to the American concept of civilization and society.
This negative descriptive language toward the Indigenous population is prevalent in primary
sources and can even be found in secondary sources written much later. In the Mexican historian
Luis González y González’s writing about liberal Mexican politicians and their difficulties
governing during the period of the Mexican-American War, descriptors such as “superstitions”
and “incompatible with scientific progress” are used when glossing over religions of Indigenous
groups and why said Indigenous groups were a prime concern for liberal politicians of the
period.42 This language fails to pay respect to Indigenous civilizations, cultures, and belief
systems, and must be analyzed and utilized with caution so as not to make similar prejudiced
claims.
To truly encompass a proper study of the Mexican-American War, including its catalysts,
happenings, and its results, one must analyze each of the groups that participated and were affected
by the war. Without proper consideration of the relationship between Indigenous groups and the
government of Mexico and the northern settlements of Mexico, one cannot truly understand the
struggles that Mexican politicians, like Mariano Otero, placed at the center of their grievances.
These same struggles of maintaining order across the nation of Mexico provided the United
States with justification to position itself as the savior of Mexico’s northern frontier, doing the
settler inhabitants a great service in defending them from the Indigenous population. In order
to comprehend the wars in this region that occurred between the United States and Indigenous
groups like the Apache, Comanche, and the Navajo, one must look to the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo and the end of the Mexican-American War when the United States acquired the vast
territory that became the American Southwest, leading to a large influx of American settlers
through the region.
40DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts, 639.
41Marcy and Medill, “Report of the Commissioner.”
42González y González, “Liberals and the Land,” 245.
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Indigenous groups are situated in both the causal and geographic heart of the MexicanAmerican War, yet in spite of this receive little to no attention in academic discussion of the war.
Indigenous groups played active roles in the fighting of the war as well as participating as political
actors in negotiations and were viewed by Americans and Mexicans as belligerents. The region
ceded to the United States by Mexico, and upon which much of the early fighting of the war took
place, was the homeland of the Apache, the Comanche, and the Navajo, as well as many other
Indigenous groups. The invasion of American and Mexican soldiers into the region, however, is
not often portrayed as an invasion of Indigenous lands rather than Mexican or American lands.
The notion that Indigenous groups had no legitimate claims to land, as American politicians like
President Andrew Jackson would have one believe, is rooted in prejudice and ignorance. When
scholars perpetuate this mindset without paying respect to Indigenous inhabitants of the region,
they do a disservice not only to the Indigenous groups that they are actively ignoring, but also
to the historical record. Much like the United States and Mexico, whose results by the end of
the war consisted of substantial geographic and political gains and losses, respectively, so too do
the Indigenous groups today exist under the conditions that came about as a direct result of the
war. Further studies of the Mexican-American War must pay closer consideration to the roles that
Indigenous groups played in the war, so as to understand the whole picture of such a monumental
historical event and the outcomes that it produced.
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